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MAY-JUNE, 1961
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONTRACTS
By PAUL F. GOLDSMITH*
The year 1960 produced sixty or more cases which could be in-
cluded in this review. In order to present most of these cases' very
little space is used for comment. Some of these cases present the
most elementary aspects of contract law. Even the experienced
lawyer can stumble on a typical textbook problem. It is hoped that
reference to this review will shorten your task of getting abreast of
the law.
The law relating to rescission based on fraud, undue influence,
mistake and related matters is greatly clarified in numerous 1960
cases.
The classification of cases chosen here may be far from ideal.
Some cases could have been reviewed under more than one head-
ing. The headings used are intended to give insight in a very gen-
eral way.
I. CONSIDERATION
The case of Adjustment Bureau v. Rogers" arises out of a dance
studio contract. Rogers, having entered into a "non-cancellable
negotiable contract" with "Arthur Murray Studios," took some in-
struction and ended up owing a substantial sum to the studio. This
contract was referred for collection to the bureau and upon a threat
of garnishment, Rogers signed an "agreement" or note to the bureau
for an increased amount including interest in advance and at-
torney's fees. This action was brought upon the new note. Rogers
claimed the new note was invalid for lack of consideration and that
it was executed under duress. The mere threat of garnishment was
held insufficient to justify a submission of the question of duress
to the jury. On the plea of lack of consideration the case was sub-
mitted to the jury which rendered a verdict in favor of the de-
fendant. Judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered so that
the issue of consideration for the new note could be determined
under proper instructions. The question being whether the bureau
expressly or impliedly undertook, with authority from the studio,
to refrain from enforcing the original note in consideration of the
execution of the note sued upon. Unless such forebearance is shown
to have been the consideration for the execution of the new note,
there was no consideration for it, since the studio would still be at
liberty to sue upon the original note. At the time defendant gave
the new note, it was uncertain who owned the original note and
the effect the new note was to have upon the original contract.
The case of Wilson v. Girley3 stands for the proposition that
mere inadequacy in the price or in the subject matter by itself, un-
accompanied by other inequitable incidents, is not a sufficient
ground for canceling an executed or executory contract. The plain-
tiff sought to cancel a deed of property he had made and delivered
* Mr. Goldsmith is a member of the Denver and Colorado Bar As'sns, member of the Denver firm
of Sears & Goldsmith, and Instructor at the University of Denver College of Law.
I Forty-nine cases are reviewed.
2 354 P.2d 605 (Colo. 1960).
3 357 P.2d 932 (Colo. 1960).
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to defendant. Plaintiff had lived for about nine months at defen-
dant's home without payment of rent and there was evidence to
indicate that the parties had intended a later marriage. The con-
sideration for the deed, as stated in a signed agreement, was de-
fendant's many services and kindnesses and plaintiff's desire to
compensate the defendant for such services and to provide for her
after plaintiff's death unless she should, before that time, marry
someone other than plaintiff.4 About nine months later, plaintiff
left defendant's home. The parties were never married. At close
of plaintiff's evidence, defendant's motion to dismiss was granted
and judgment was entered for defendant. This judgment was af-
firmed.
The case of Sargent v. Crandall5 deals with a crop sharing ar-
rangement under which Crandall occupied Sargent's land, agreeing
to drill and equip one well with Sargent agreeing to pay for Cran-
dall's installation of the other two wells. If Crandall vacated before
the end of five years, Sargent was to pay for the well Crandall
drilled and equipped. Sargent had prepared a written agreement
on these terms and delivered it, unsigned, to Crandall who signed
it but never returned it to Sargent. Crandall vacated after two
years. The parties tried to get a loan for Sargent in order that he
might reimburse Crandall, but Sargent was unable to secure such
a loan to pay the cost of the first well and the unpaid bills on the
second. Sargent appeals from an adverse judgment claiming a
failure to prove a contract and a failure to prove any sum owing.
In affirming the trial court's judgment, the court held that while
the instrument Sargent had prepared created no contractual obliga-
tions per se, because it was not signed, it represented tangible evi-
dence of Sargent's request that Crandall perform certain acts and
furnished a past consideration ". . . for the later promise of Sargent
(in a form of a recognition of the obligation, and efforts to secure
a loan to pay for that which was done), thereby establishing an en-
forceable obligation." This appears to be a proper case for the ap-
plication of the rule that a consideration executed at the request
of the promissor supports a later promise to pay for the considera-
tion provided the consideration was not originally rendered gratu-
itously.6
Gould v. Rite-Way Oil & Inv. Co.7 is an action for specific per-
formance or, in the alternative, for damages. Gould sued on a con-
tract in which defendants agreed to sell certain working interest in
designated oil and/or gas wells for a stated amount with manner
of payment and receipt of deposit clearly stated. The balance due
"to be paid to the sellers by the buyer upon delivery by the sellers
to the buyer of a free and clear marketable title acceptable to the
buyer and a copy of the operating agreement acceptable to the buy-
er." It was defendants contention that the use of the word "ac-
ceptable" destroyed the mutuality of the obligation enabling the
4 The agreement provided that the deed shall stand so long as the grantee, during the lifetime
of the plaintiff, remains unmarried, other than the marriage to plaintiff. It was noted in passing
that plaintiff had failed to raise in his pleading an issue concerning the deed and agreement being
a restraint on marriage and contrary to public policy. Having failed to raise this issue, plaintiff
could not present the issue for the first time on appeal.
5 352 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1960).
6 See Lampleigh v. Brathwait, Hob. 106, 80 Eng. Rep. 255 (1616) a leading English case cited
in support of the decision.
7 351 P.2d 849 (Colo. 1960).
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buyer to refuse to go forward on the ground that title was not ac-
ceptable. The trial court held that the agreement lacked mutuality
of obligation, and it dismissed the complaint. In reversing the dis-
missal, the court construed the word "acceptable" to mean only that
the title tendered should conform to the standard which the law
would regard as clear and merchantable, and that upon tender of
such title, plaintiff would be bound to perform or answer to de-
fendants in damages. Accordingly, there was a binding obligation
to pay the balance upon performance by the sellers of their con-
tractual covenants and therefore the sellers are in position to main-
tain an action against the buyer if he should fail to meet his ob-
ligations, and there exists correlative obligation on the part of the
sellers to convey.8
II. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT
The written contract in Skinner v. Davidson, Inc.,9 provided
for sale by plaintiff of its automobile dealership and equipment to
defendant. The price of tools, equipment, furniture and fixtures
was to be determined by appraisal based on ". . . replacement cost.
Replacement cost shall be deemed to be that amount at which any
item could be replaced at retail by an item of comparable kind,
quality, and condition, at seller's place of business."' 1 The parties
chose one Chase to make the appraisal. When Chase submitted his
appraisal, the buyer objected to the method that had been followed.
The appraiser did not seek to discover replacement cost of the items
which were being appraised; he substituted another method, that
of the price of the item new less depreciation. The trial court en-
tered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant based
upon the report of the appraiser. This judgment was reversed. The
court held that the burden of proving that the agreed basis for ap-
praisal had been carried out was upon the plaintiff who relied upon
the report of the appraiser. The method of computation used by
Chase, namely fair depreciated value, is different from replacement
cost. The court stated that should there be no second-hand market
value for certain items, fair or reasonable value would then become
the criterion."'
In Beck v. Giordano,'2 the trial court's judgment cancelled de-
fendant's lease of a restaurant. The lease was for a period of five
years and contained an option for five one year renewals at the
same rental. After entering into the lease, the defendant expended
substantial sums of money in remodeling the premises and there-
after operated a restaurant at the premises for five years. During
the fifth year, defendant permitted her son to operate a fire works
stand on the premises for a period of twenty days, over the objec-
8 This case approves the holding in Stiles v. McClellan, 6 Colo. 89, 90, 22 Poc. 460, 461 (1881),
where it is said. .. . [T]here is an important qualification to that rule [that a promise is a good
consideration for a promise], which is, that there must be an absolute mutuality of engagement, so
that each party may have an action on it, or neither will be bound."
9 351 P.2d 872 (Colo. 1960).
10 Id. at 873.
11 Skinner v. Davidson, 351 P.2d 872, 878 (Colo. 1960), citing 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1362 (Rev.
ed. 1960) which deals with a contract for sale of goods with a price to be fixed by appraisal. If it
becomes impossible after performance by the seller to determine price in a manner contemplated "the
buyer will have to pay the reasonable value of what he had received and retained."
12 356 P.2d 264 (Colo. 1960).
SECHS-LAWLOR- CORPORTIOn SEALS- ALPINE 5- 3422
DICTA
MAY-JUNE, 1961
tion of the landlords. The landlords then sued to terminate the
lease claiming, among other things, the breach of the agreement to
occupy the premises as a restaurant. There were no words of limi-
tation of use in the lease. In reversing the trial court, the court
held that the provision authorizing use of the premises for a speci-
fied purpose is generally regarded as permissive, rather than re-
strictive, and does not limit the use of the premises by the lessee to
such purpose nor impliedly forbid its use for a similar lawful pur-
pose which is not injurious to the landlor.':; rights or not otherwise
forbidden. To hold otherwise, in this case, would work a forfeiture.
Provisions for forfeiture are strictly construed against the person
asserting them. The court specifically found that although the de-
fendant's act was willful, it was not, ipso facto, a violation of the
terms of the lease because it was not specifically prohibited and
was not a substantial reason for terminating the lease especially
since no additional fire hazard was created, no other tenants were
molested, and no insurance was cancelled because of defendant's
act.
Fruhling v. E1lis13 involves a contract for purchase of real prop-
erty which states ". . . time shall be of the essence of this agree-
ment and in case of failure . . . to make any of the payments ... to
be made or performed by them [the buyers], this agreement may
be forfeited ... at the option of [sellers] by giving ... fifteen days
notice in writing of their intention so to do, in which event it is
agreed that all payments made hereunder shall be kept and re-
tained by [sellers] as liquidated damages .... ,,14 The contract did
not state when possession was to be delivered and was silent as to
procedures to be followed in the event title was to be found un-
merchantable. Two weeks after entering into the contract, plain-
tiff's attorney rendered an opinion and delivered a copy of it to de-
fendant's counsel stating numerous objections to title. There fol-
lowed a course of dealing between parties leading to the correction
of the title in accordance with the demands of plaintiff. Defendant
did not acquiesce in the contention thattitle was unmerchantable
but did, nevertheless, endeavor to comply with the various de-
mands. Three and a half months after the notice of the alleged de-
fects, and following extensive efforts to comply with the require-
ments of plaintiff, plaintiff stated "I am through arguing, I won't
have anything to do with it." Thereafter, plaintiff was notified by
defendant's counse] that the defendant had elected to terminate the
contract and to retain the $3,500 deposit as a forfeiture unless
plaintiff completed the purchase within fifteen days. The evidence
showed that the defendants had acted diligently to comply with
plaintiff's title requirement. A judgment against plaintiff on the
action to recover the deposit was affirmed, the court stating that
since no definite time is fixed by the contract for tendering an
abstract, merchantable title, curing defects, etc., the vendor shall
have a reasonable time for so doing, and the fact that the contract
provides that "time shall be of the essence of this agreement" adds
nothing to an agreement which fixes no time for the doing of an act.
la 352 P.2d 656 (Colo. 1960).




Plaintiffs, in Marlatt v. LaGrange,15 sued to recover a $2,000
deposit on an option contract for sale and purchase of residence
property which provided that the total price of $18,500 was to be
paid as follows: "$2,000 in cash .. .; obtain maximum loan and bal-
ance to be carried on second deed of trust by seller, on or before
three years." 16 Parol testimony was admitted to show that the par-
ties expected the property to carry a $14,000-14,750 maximum loan,
and on that basis the agreement was entered into. Such a loan was
not obtainable. After an extension of the closing date, the sellers
notified the buyers that they were declaring a forfeiture of the
$2,000 down payment as liquidated damages under terms of the
agreement. Judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for return of the
$2,000 deposit was affirmed. The court held that the words "obtain
maximum loan" being vague and indefinite and not explained in
the writing could be explained by parol evidence and when so ex-
plained clearly stated a condition precedent to the obligation of
plaintiffs to complete the transaction. The condition precedent not
having occurred, plaintiffs were not bound by the option and their
deposit must be refunded.
The vendees in Morley v. Gieseker,I under what appears to be
similar to the local bar association-approved form of receipt and
option, delivered a copy of their attorney's title opinion to the ven-
dor showing title not to be marketable, and demanded return of
their earnest money. This demand was refused. The vendees then
commenced action to recover the earnest money and deposited the
abstract in court. The applicable contract provision was ". . . if title
is not merchantable and written notice of defects is given to the
seller or agent within the time herein provided for delivery of deed
[February 1, 1956] and shall not be rendered merchantable within
thirty days after such written notice . . ." the purchasers shall be
entitled to return of their down payment upon return of the abs-
tract to the seller. The title opinion objecting to title as being Un-
merchantable was dated January 7, 1956. A decree quieting title
was entered February 8, 1956, counsel for plaintiffs refusing to ac-
cept the title as merchantable for the reason that the decree was
rendered against third parties, who may have an interest in the
land, upon whom constructive service of process, only, was had.
Such defendants had six months from the entry of the decree to
move that the decree be set aside."' The trial court entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. This judgment was affirmed.
The general rule is stated to be that a quiet title decree does not
convert a defective title into a good or merchantable title until the
judgment becomes impervious to attack. Re-delivery of the abstract
was held not to be a condition precedent to the institution of the
action but was only an incident to the right to return of the deposit.
Plaintiff, in Chisholm v. Reitler,19 -is assignor of an optionee
who had paid down fifty per cent on the purchase of an unimproved
lot and sues to recover the fifty per cent deposited. The contract
15 357 P.2d 927 (Colo. 1960).
16 Ibid.
17 351 P.2d 392 (Colo. 1960).
18 Id. at 393.
19 352 P.2d 794 (Colo. 1960).
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provided for delivery of a general warranty deed on April 29, 1957,
and that a title policy would be furnished on or before date of clos-
ing. There was a blanket title policy available on the subdivision
but no separate policy had been ordered on the particular lot. The
purchaser had exhibited an unwillingness to close and the contract
had been extended at the purchaser's request. The vendor-defend-
ant finally wrote the purchaser stating that unless payment were
tendered within ten days, the agreement would be cancelled and
the down payment forfeited. Thereafter, purchaser demanded re-
turn of the down payment and assigned his rights to plaintiff to
commence the present action. No appearance was made in the ap-
peal by the defendant-in-error. This contract, as the contract in the
Fruhling case,20 provided that time was of the essence. The failure
of the purchaser to tender the balance of the purchase price excused
the defendant from being required to tender the title policy. These
two performances were concurrently conditional. There never hav-
ing been a closing, due to the purchaser's unwillingness to close,
the defendant was never in default in tendering the policy.
21
Wagner v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 2 2 is an action on a fire insurance
policy which provided that if the insured and the company failed
to agree on the actual cash value of the loss, each would appoint an
appraiser and the two appraisers would appoint an umpire with the
decision of any two being binding as to the actual cash value and
loss. The policy also provided that there could be no suit or action
on the policy ". . . unless all the requirements of the policy shall
have been complied with, and unless commenced within twelve
months next after inception of the loss. ' 23 Following a loss covered
by the policy, plaintiff appointed an appraiser, defendant appointed
an appraiser, and an umpire was .appointed by the two appraisers.
Plaintiff was dissatisfied with the amount found due under the ap-
praisal clause and brought an action upon the policy contending
that appraisal was a condition precedent to right to sue upon the
policy. In affirming a judgment limiting recovery to an amount
found due under the appraisal, the court held that the appraisal
clause was not a condition precedent to the right to bring action
upon the policy. Because plaintiffs elected to follow the appraisal
procedure, they are bound by the results thereof. Plaintiffs could
have brought action on the policy at the outset without having re-
sorted to the appraisal. Having exercised their option to determine
the question of loss by appraisal, they are irrevocably bound by the
amount of loss so determined.
In the case of Koscove v. Brunger,2 4 plaintiffs sought to rescind
a contract for purchase of certain furniture, fixtures and equipment
on which they had made a $1,500 down payment. Defendant coun-
terclaimed for the balance due. After making the down payment
and removing certain inconsequential items from the premises
where the furniture and fixtures had been stored, the vendor's land-
lord padlocked the storeroom and asserted a lien on the remaining
20 Supro, note 13.
21 Plaintiff asserted that to forfeit one-half of the purchase price constituted o penalty, but he
failed to produce evidence which would substantiate the contention that the liquidated damages in
this instance amounted to a penalty. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.
22 348 P.2d 150 (Colo. 1960).
23 Id. at 151.
24 352 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1960).
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furniture and fixtures. The vendee had no knowledge of the pre-
vious dispute between the vendor and the landlord. For this breach
of an implied warranty of title, the vendee asserted a right to res-
cind. This evidence was held to be sufficient to base rescission upon
breach of the implied warranty of title. The court held that where
a seller of chattels is guilty of a breach of an implied warranty of
title, and the purchaser, relying upon such warranty, had sold or
disposed of a minor portion of the chattels, such purchaser may,
upon learning of the defect of title, elect to rescind the entire trans-
action. This result is in accordance with the applicable provisions
of the Uniform Sales Act.2 5 In the instant case, the deterioration
or injury, by disposing of the inconsequential items, was in good
faith and due to the breach of warranty and, therefore, did not pre-
vent the buyer from returning or offering to return the other goods
to seller and rescinding this sale.
Marzec brought action for damages in Marzec v. Fremont
County School Dist. No. 2-6 alleging that his contract as a public
school teacher was wrongfully terminated by defendant-district. He
showed that he had been employed by the district from December,
1951 to August 31, 1952, and thereafter for three successive periods
commencing September 1st and ending the immediate August 31st
following. The applicable statute 2 7 grants stable and continuous
tenure to a teacher who has served "... on a regular full time basis
25 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 121-1-13 (1953), which deals with implied warranties of title; and Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 121-1-69 (1953), which provides for rescission upon breach of warranty with certain limitations
stated.
26 349 P.2d 699 (Colo. 1960).
27 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 123-18-3 (1953),
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continuously and without interruption for three full years, who
shall thereafter ... be re-employed for the fourth year immediately
succeeding . . . ." In approving dismissal of the complaint on mo-
tion, the court stated that since the teacher tenure law is in derroga-
tion of the common law principle, under which an employer would
be at liberty to hire and fire at will, it must be construed in favor
of the board. Therefore, the work "year" must be strictly construed
as a calendar year and at no time was plaintiff re-employed after
three full calendar years for a fourth year. If he had been so re-
employed, he would have been entitled to tenure.
IV. DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
Plaintiff instituted action in Redak v. Leigh28 on a promissory
note, seeking the principal amount of $1,500 plus interest and at-
torney's fees. The defendant tendered his answer and deposited
$1,550 in the registry of the district court with a prayer that the
court determine what portion of the amount deposited was due the
plaintiff and how much should be returned to the defendant. The
trial court found that the matter of attorney's fees provided for in
the promissory note was not a "justiciable controversy." The deci-
sion was reversed with regard to the denial of attorney's fees with
an order that judgment be entered for the plaintiff in the amount
of attorney's fees due for institution and prosecution of suit in the
trial court only. The court held that the defendant's denial of lia-
bility for, and his refusal to pay, an attorney's fee along with the
admitted balance due on the note, did present a justiciable contro-
versy. In such instances the trial court must determine whether
the plaintiff had either obligated himself to pay, or had actually
paid, attorneys fees, and the reasonableness of the amount.
The Aabergs had apparently bilked plaintiffs in Aaberg v. Har-
man29 of $143,000 by making material misrepresentations concern-
ing a mining venture. Upon learninq of the falsity of the represen-
tations_ plaintiffs served a "notice of rescission and offer of restora-
tion" on the Aabergs and delivered to the Aabergs everything plain-
tiffs had received in the nature of percentage interests in certain
mining claims and other holdings and certificates and so-called
trusts. Thereupon, plaintiffs instituted action to recover the amount
paid under the contract. Judgment was rendered in their favor for
$143,000, plus exemplary damages of $46,804 and body judgment. 30
The court describes plaintiff's relief as recission, seeking return of
money paid as in an action in assumpsit for money had and re-
ceived. • ' Since the present action was not one for damages, exem-
plary damages could not be recovered under the sfatute 2 The
plaintiff's right of action grew out of a tort, or can be said to be
founded upon tort, and in such instance a body execution may issue
regardless of the form of action, be it tort for damages or in as-
sumpsit for money had and received. Accordingly, the judgment
was affirmed as to the $143,000, plus interest, and the body judg-
9 354 P.2d 1016 (Colo. 1960).
29 358 P.2d 601 (Colo. 1960).
30 See Gilbraltar Colorado Life Co. v. Brink, 113 Colo. 304, 306, 157 P.2d 134 (1945); Jessey v.
Butterfield, 61 Colo. 256, 259, 157 Pac. 1, 2 (1916).
31 Wheeler v. Wilkin, 98 Colo. 568, 570, 58 P.2d 1223, 1224 (1936).
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-2-2 (1953).
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ment, but was modified with directions to vacate the judgment for
exemplary damages.
A judgment in favor of plaintiff on a jury verdict in Fleming v.
Scott 33 was reversed as being excessive and the cause remanded
for a new trial. The defendant agreed to remodel plaintiff's home
and, among other things, to install two floor furnaces. The furnaces
appeared to be defective in either operation or installation and
after four years the plaintiff installed a forced air heating system
requiring extensive work not covered by the contract. From the
amount of the verdict, it appears that the jury had relied heavily
upon the cost of installing the forced air system. The proper rule
of damages in situations of this kind is that the owner is entitled
to the cost of replacement of effectively operating floor furnaces, if
such are available, or a return of that portion of the contract price
represented by the cost of the floor furnace installation, having
due consideration for depreciation of the equipment by use. The
owner, however, cannot charge the contractor for more and differ-
ent kinds of material than that embraced in the contract.
3 4
The first claim in Landauer v. Huey3' alleged a breach of con-
tract by the assignee of an oil and gas lease. The assignee uncondi-
tionally promised to drill a well within sixty days from completion
of a commercial producer in consideration for the assignment. The
evidence showed that two commercially producing wells had been
drilled on the assigned acreage. It is undisputed that the defendant-
assignee failed to commence drilling a third well within sixty days
of completion of the second well. The trial court awarded $33,000
damages for defendant-assignee's failure to drill the third well.
This sum was equal to the reasonable cost of drilling the well. The
defendants contended that the amount of damages should be limit-
ed to the expected loss of royalty from failure to drill the third
well. In rejecting this standard, the court approved damages meas-
ured by "cost of the well" in cases where the breach is of an un-
conditional promise to drill a specific well (such well being a pri-
mary object of the contract) and the cost of the well appears to be
the most logical standard by which the extent of the loss of the
promisee can be measured.3 6
In Horton v. Hedberg,3 suit was instituted upon a promissory
note given by defendants in lieu of cash or earnest money under a
receipt and option, which provided that if any payment or condi-
tion is not made, tendered or performed by the purchasers, then the
contract is void and of no effect and both parties are released from
obligation thereunder, provided, however, that the payments made
thereon are to be retained as liquidated damages. The judgment of
the trial court dismissing plaintiff's complaint was reversed with
order to enter findings on issues presented by the pleadings and
33 348 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1960).
14 Restatement, Contracts § 329 comment (a) (1932).
35 352 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1960).
36 The case also approved a definition of a commercial producer as a well that will return a
profit over operating expenses, rejecting any definition based upon whether the well will return a
profit after recovery of all drilling expenses.
37 351 P.2d 843 (Colo. 1960).
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evidence or for a new trial. The court held that the promissory
note became an absolute obligation at the time of the signing of
the option agreement by the vendor and the vendee. Accordingly,
the amount due under the note was subject to forfeiture to the
same extent that a cash deposit would have been.
The case of Von Riesen v. Greeley Finance Co. 3 1 involved a
third party creditor beneficiary relationship. A and B were joint
debtors to the plaintiff finance company. B and third party defend-
ant Von Riesen, for valuable consideration, entered into a contract,
partly proven by a memorandum and partly by parol evidence,
under which Von Riesen agreed to settle B's obligation to plaintiff.
The court approved interest, as damages, at the rate of two per
cent per month under an applicable statute39 from the date of de-
fault on the note to the date of filing the complaint. Von Riesen
was held to be liable for the entire debt and not just one-half of it
since B, under the terms of the joint obligation to the plaintiff, was
obligated to pay, and was sued for, the entire debt and not only
one-half thereof.
V. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
Union Interchange, Inc. v. Sierota40 illustrates the rule that
time, place or manner of acceptance of an offer must be in compli-
ance with requirements specified in the offer.41 The defendant
signed a contract form providing for his payment of $150 for certain
advertisements regarding sale of defendant's business. The con-
tract stated, ". . . this agreement shall become effective only when
accepted by your office in Los Angeles, California. You shall notify
me of such acceptance. '42 Plaintiff failed to show the specified ap-
proval and notice of acceptance of the defendant's offer. Judgment
in favor of the defendant was affirmed.
A trial court judgment in favor of a stockbroker-plaintiff was
reversed on evidence in Baldwin v. Peters, Writer & Christensen
43
showing that the defendants ordered the plaintiff-stockbroker to
purchase specified stock at 2c per share, but the broker purchased
at 2 1/8c per share. The defendants refused to pay for the stock.
The broker later sold the stock for an undisclosed price. No en-
forceable contract was made. The defendants' offer was rejected
when the broker purchased stock at an unauthorized price.
44
The case of Howard v. White4;, emphasizes the importance of
correctly stating the identity of contracting parties. Here, the de-
fendant, Howard, received $20,640 from the plaintiff, in connection
with a dance contract form, signed "ARTHUR MURRAY, INC., By,
Authorized Signature." The evidence conclusively showed that
Howard had no authority to sign for Arthur Murray. Inc., and the
action was dismissed as to Arthur Murray, Inc. The trial court
found ". . . there never was a contract between the plaintiff, Myr-
tle K. White, and the.... defendant .... Budd Howard, individually
'38 350 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1960)
39 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 73-3-5 (1953).
40 355 P.2d 1089 (Colo. 1960).
41 Restatement, Contracts § 61 (1932).
42 355 P.2d 1089, 1090 (Colo. 1960).
43 349 P.2d 146 (Colo. 1960).
44 Nucla Sanitation Dist. v. Rippy, 344 P.2d 976 (Colo. 1960); 1 Williston, Contracts 4 51 (3rd
ed. 1957).
45 356 P.2d 484 (Colo. 1960).
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and doing business as the Arthur Murray Studios. There was only
an unsuccessful attempt to execute a contract between plaintiff and
Arthur Murray, Inc.4 6 Howard did not attempt to contract in his
individual capacity. Accordingly, judgment in favor of plaintiff for
the value of the unused lessons, $14,000 plus interest, was affirmed.
In Walden v. Koehler47 the owner-defendant authorized one
Hurd to contract for the installation of a furnace and paid the cost
of the furnace to Hurd. Hurd entered into a contract with plaintiff
in the name of the owner regarding installation of the furnace.
Hurd failed to pay for the furnace and the owner denied liability
claiming he had paid Hurd as an independent contractor. Judg-
ment in favor of the owner was reversed with directions to enter
judgment in favor of plaintiff, the court noting that there was no
evidence to support a finding that Hurd was an independent con-
tractor and on the contrary he was specifically held to be the ser-
vant or agent of the owner, duly authorized to contract for the
furnace on behalf of the owner.
The plaintiff, in Fellows v. Cantrell,48 at a minor's request,
furnished funds for a two year college education. The minor, after
reaching the age of twenty-one not only failed to disaffirm the con-
tract within a reasonable time but five years later expressly ratified
and acknowledged the obligation. Judgment in favor of the defend-
ant was reversed. The case follows the well established rule that
while a contract of a minor is not void, but voidable only at the
election of the minor on arrival at maturity, such election must be
made within a reasonable time after reaching maturity; the failure
to disaffirm within such reasonable time constitutes a ratification.
In Gray v. Quiller,49 Quiller and Hunt were tenants-in-common
of two parcels of real property that they leased to Ramstetter with
an option in Ramstetter to buy at a stated price during the term
of the lease. Prior to expiration of the lease, Hunt died and devised
her one-half interest in one property to Quiller and her one-half
interest in the other property to Gray. Thereafter, Ramstetter al-
lowed his option to lapse. Two days after the lease terminated, he
purchased Quiller's interest in both properties for $10,000. Gray ap-
parently tried to secure a judgment for part of this purchase price.
The trial court dismissed Gray's complaint at the close of plaintiff's
46 Id. at 485.
47 349 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1960).
48 352 P.2d 289 (Colo. 1960).
49 355 P.2d 99 (Colo. 1960).
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evidence. This dismissal was affirmed on appeal. The case is of in-
terest only to the extent that it approves the language of an earlier
case stating "A contract of sale creates mutual obligations on the
part of the seller to sell and on the part of the purchaser to buy,
while an option gives the right to purchase, within a limited time,
without imposing any obligations to purchase. °5 0 Ramstetter could
refuse to buy under the option and was free to deal with Quiller as
to Quiller's separately owned interests in the property.
The case of Witherspoon v. Pusch51 exemplifies the established
rule that paroi evidence may be used to show that a writing was
neither executed nor delivered as a final contract, but was to be-
come effective only at some future day or on the happening of
some contingency. 5 Here, the offeror signed and delivered a writ-
ten offer to purchase real property to the agent of the vendor. As
a convenience to the agent, a check for the deposit was also deliv-
ered. The vendor and agent sued, unsuccessfully, on the check and
contract. The offeror was permitted, over objection, to testify that
the offer to purchase was not a firm offer and that the check for
the down payment was to be held until the offeror had an oppor-
tunity to investigate zoning restrictions and the adaptability of the
.property to intended uses. The trial court's ruling, permitting the
introduction of this evidence, was approved on appeal.
Parol evidence was rejected in King Collection Bureau v.
Bruns53 where such evidence would vary the plain terms of a writ-
ten agreement. The plaintiff was the assignee of the original holder
of a note executed by Bruns, which note contained an ambiguous
provision that it could be repaid by ". . . return of the participating
production certificates and common stock, .. .,54 but did not iden-
tify such items. The defendants, by their answer, specifically de-
scribed the participating certificates and stock and deposited the
same in the registry of the court for the purpose of discharging the
note. Plaintiff's reply admitted the identity of the certificates and
stock. Summary judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants
and affirmed. The plaintiff was not permitted to show by parol evi-
dence that defendants' right to discharge the note by redelivery of
the certificates and stock was conditioned upon certain unstated
events. The issue of such conditionality, attempted to be raised in
plaintiff's reply, would have varied or contradicted the plain terms
of the written instrument, as explained by the pleadings, in viola-
tion of the parol evidence rule.
Plaintiffs brought action for specific performance of contract
to convey real property and for other relief in Coulter v. Ander-
son.55 Defendants counterclaimed for damages and denied the ex-
istence of a contract. The evidence showed that the Andersons and
Coulters entered into a written contract regarding the purchase and
sale of the Coulters' ranch. There were a great many details that
were not included in the primary contract. Andersons entered into
possession and operated the ranch and tendered a supplementary
50 Stelson v. Haigler, 63 Colo. 200, 208, 165 Poc. 265, 268 (1917).
51 349 P.2d 137 (Colo. 1960). *
52 3 Williston, Contracts § 634 (Rev. ed. 1936).
53 354 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1960).
54 Ibid.
55 357 P.2d 76 (Colo. 1960).
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contract covering all but one of the additional demands of the
Coulters.56 In affirming a decree granting specific performance in
favor of the Andersons, the court held that the supplemental agree-
ment as to the omitted matters was not intended by the parties to
be a condition to the formation of the primary contract and it was
not intended that there be a fully integrated contract embodying
the omitted matters. 57 It was further held that specific performance
is not to be limited to fact situations in which a complete agree-
ment has been reduced to writing, especially where it is shown that
a writing is not intended to be fully integrated and the omitted
items can be proven by parol. Accordingly, the statute of frauds5
is not applicable since the parties did not intend to postpone a legal
meeting of the minds until the additional matters were reduced to
writing.
VI. FRAUD, ESTOPPEL, UNDUE INFLUENCE, MISTAKE
The decision in Atkinson v. Englewood State Bank59 has been
long needed in order to provide a standard which might protect the
public against the vicious tactics often used in certain fields of spe-
cialty selling today. The payee of a negotiable instrument brought
action against the maker. The defendant-maker alleged that he had
been induced to sign a contract for purchase of a rug and to sign a
so-called "contract" in blank which was in fact a cognovit note, the
note on which payee sued. The trial court entered judgment in
favor of the payee and refused to submit the defendant's defense
of fraud in the inducement to the jury. In reversing the trial court,
Justice Doyle states that the evidence submitted by the defendant
was sufficient in quality and quantity to establish fraud in the in-
ducement thereby requiring the payee to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that it was in fact a holder in due course.60 The
evidence which constituted fraud in the inducement consisted of
one Palmer's having exhibited a high quality sample of carpeting
to the defendant, representing to the defendant that Palmer would
pay $50 for the privilege of photographing the installed carpeting
in the defendant's home, and $25 for each lead furnished by the de-
fendant to whom Palmer was able to make a sale of carpeting,
thereby implying that defendant and Palmer were almost partners.
In addition, the contract contained a misleading heading. The court
rejected a contention that there had been fraud in the procurement
inasmuch as the defendant-maker knew that his signature created
a ]eval obligation and he was duty bound to read the instrument
which he signed in blank. His failure to do so was negligence in
law. In determining that the plaintiff was not a holder in due
course, the court pointed to the fact that the plaintiff-bank merely
credited Palmer's account with the proceeds of the note, without
more, and did not show that Palmer was allowed to draw checks
against the credit thus extended. The opinion states that the ma-
56 The matters omitted from the written agreement included a chattel mortgage on Personalty as
security, an agreement to except a twenty acre tract from the primary contract, the location of a
cabin site reserved by the Coulters, the terms and conditions for use of utilities, the riahts of ingress
and egress, the furnishinn of doiry products and pasturage rights, and the fishing and boat storage
rights to be extended by the Andersons to the Coulters.
57 Accord. 165 A.L.R. 756 (1946); 122 A.L.R. 1219 (1939). See also Restatement, Contracts § 33
(1932); 12 Am. Jur., Contracts 1 235 (1938).
58 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 59-1-8 (1953).
59 348 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1960).
60 Britton, Bills & Notes §1 125 and 130 (1943) (fraud as a defense).
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jority view in the United States is that a bank does not become a
holder for value merely by giving credit."1 If the plaintiff had sus-
tained the burden of proving that it was a holder in due course, the
defense of fraud in the inducement would not have been available
to the defendant. The court was not required to determine whether
such a payee as the bank could ever be a holder in due course un-
der these circumstances evidencing a course of dealings between
the specialty salesman and the payee-bank.
An action, based on undue influence, was brought in Benway
v. National State Bank6 2 against the conservator of the estate of
Benway's grandmother and against Benway's father, Elmer, to
rescind deeds conveying plaintiff's interest in certain properties to
her grandmother, a mental incompetent, and the latter's subsequent
deeding of the properties to Elmer. Evidence was introduced show-
ing that when Benway was about to marry, being then of the age
of 38 years, her marriage was opposed by the grandmother and El-
mer. Two days before her wedding, at the grandmother's insist-
ence, plaintiff signed a deed to one of the properties before the
grandmother's attorney. The attorney testified that plaintiff was
in a very depressed condition, tearful and emotional. After the
marriage, Benway, while in an emotional and distraught state,
signed the second deed regarding the other property before the
same attorney for the purpose of trying to make her grandmother
happy and to help preserve her marriage. About two years later,
Elmer was successful in getting the grandmother, then 86 years of
age, in poor health, and with failing hearing, impaired eye sight
and high blood pressure, to execute a deed to him regarding both
properties. Elmer and the grandmother had long been at odds
with each other. A physician testified that, in his opinion, the
grandmother was a mental incompetent when she signed the deeds
to Elmer, and that two years afterwards she was so adjudicated.
The trial court quieted Benway's title as a joint tenant in one prop-
erty and ordered reconveyance of the other property to restore all
titles to the status that existed prior to Benway's first conveyance.
On appeal, the court held that there was ample competent evidence
of undue influence to sustain the finding and decree of the trial
court.
63
Action was brought in Handy v. Rogers64 on a purchase money
note and mortgage given by defendants to plaintiff-vendor in part
payment of a hotel. Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff in
an amount in excess of $40,000 including interest, attorneys fees
and amounts advanced for insurance. The original sales price had
been $40,000 of which $6,000 was paid down and defendants had
paid $4,400 for improvements before vacating the property. In af-
firming the judgment for plaintiff, the court noted that there was
ample evidence of misrepresentation concerning the earnings of
the hotel property. The misrepresentations, however, were held
not to be material since they related to a period of time more than
61 Id. § 167.
62 357 P.2d 912 (Colo. 1960).
63 For an excellent discussion of the elements required in efforts to set aside a transaction based
upon undue influence see Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Major Premise, 53 Yale L. J.
271 (1943-44).
64 351 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1960).
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three years prior to the sale, and defendants had not justifiably re-
lied upon these representations. There was also ample evidence
that the defendants did not seasonably rescind, whereas it is incum-
bent upon a defrauded party to promptly and unequivocally give
notice of election to avoid the contract.65 The judgment was modi-
fied for other reasons.66
In Simon v. Lloyd,67 the judgment of the trial court in award-
ing damages to plaintiff for breach of warranty on sale of baled
hay was affirmed. The trial court found that defendant had repre-
sented the hay to be "very good quality wire-tied baled alfalfa hay"
and that the hay was of "good quality." The trial court found on
disputed evidence that the hay was not of good quality on the date
of sale, and that plaintiff relied on the oral representations as to
quality.
The judgment creditors of an automobile liability policy holder
and the policy holder sued the insurance company in Safeco Ins. Co.
of America v. Gonacha 8 upon a liability policy issued to the judg-
ment debtor. The company defended on the grounds that the in-
sured, in his application for insurance, falsely stated the following:
(a) That no insurer cancelled or refused him insurance; (b) That
he had not been convicted or forfeited bail for traffic violation dur-
ing the past three years; and (c) That he had not been involved
in an accident within the past three years. Eight days after the ac-
cident on which the judgment creditors had previously sued the in-
sured, the company gave notice of cancellation and tendered back
the premium, which was refused. At the conclusion of all the evi-
dence, a verdict was directed in favor of the plaintiffs. The judg-
ment entered on this verdict was reversed in favor of the insurance
company. The false representations were not attached to the policy
as issued. The court held that representations, as distinguished
from warranties, need not be attached to the contract in order for
the insurer to rely upon the same. The representations being false
and material to the risk, and the insurance company having relied
thereon in entering into the contract, the necessary grounds to void
the policy were met.6 9 Another case reached the same result. 70
Dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint in Drake v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co.7' was affirmed. Plaintiffs sued upon defendant's
binder to issue an automobile liability and medical payment policy
to plaintiffs. The binder had been issued on one of plaintiffs' written
representations that no insurer had cancelled or refused to issue or
renew plaintiffs' automobile insurance within three years. This rep-
65 Accord, Restatement, Contracts § 480 (1932), cited with approval, id. at 823.
66 Having entered judgment, the trial court then ordered the sheriff to sell the property which
was secured by a deed of trust at a special execution sale after 30 days publication of the notice of
sale. Although a deed of trust may be foreclosed under court order, the outcome of this sale was
that the plaintiff repurchased the property for $1,000, leaving unsatisfied a judgment still exceeding
$40,000. To correct this inequitable situation, the Supreme Court ordered that the sheriff's sale be
set aside and that a new soe be held with the trial court supervising the same and requiring a
return and report of sale and approval thereof by the trial court. The final direction to the trial court
directed that "the trial judge should disapprove any sale at a price which bears no relationship to
the actual value of the property."
67 350 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1960).
68 350 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1960).
69 Inasmuch as this policy was a "voluntary" oalicy as distinguished from an assigned risk or
involuntary policy under the Colorado Financial Responsibility Law, the insurance ccrrier did not
become absolutely bound under statute upon the occurrence of the accident July 8, 1955.




resentation was false. Following the rule of the Safeco case,72 the
court held that misrepresentations made by the applicant in the ap-
plication for automobile insurance voided the policy and no recov-
ery therefore could be had upon the policy or the binder.
The judgments of the trial court on two suits in rescission of
vendor-purchaser contracts rescinding the contract of one and
awarding damages regarding the other were affirmed in Cohen v.
Vivian.73 The respective purchasers had signed contracts to pur-
chase adjacent duplexes in the early stages of construction. The
contracts stated that the purchasers relied upon inspection and not
upon representations of any person. The vendors learned during
excavation of the premises that the land was filled soil and re-
quired alteration in the plans for foundations of the duplexes.
Shortly after the purchasers occupied the premises, the respective
houses sank, tilted and cracked to such an extent that one had to be
vacated and the other required substantial expenditures to render
it safe for habitation. These defects resulted directly from the un-
stable soil condition. The court held that the defective soil condi-
tion was a latent defect from the standpoint of the purchasers but
equivalent to a patent defect from the standpoint of the vendors in
view of their prior discovery that it was filled ground. "A latent
soil defect, known to the seller of a house built on such soil, creates
a duty of disclosure in the seller. His failure to disclose amounts
to concealment, making him vulnerable to a suit based upon
fraud. '74 The doctrine of caveat emptor cannot be a shield in such
case. Since the purchaser's inspection did not disclose the defect,
the vendor was required to disclose it, and this duty to disclose is
not eliminated by the contract provision regarding inspection by
the vendees.
In McKinney v. Christmas,75 Christmas was an agent in the
sale of plaintiff's property under an installment type contract.
Christmas' office collected payments on the contract. When the
purchaser defaulted, one of Christmas' employees acquired the in-
terest of the purchaser and subsequently sold the property at a
substantial profit. The acquisition by Christmas' employee and the
sale for profit was not disclosed to plaintiff. Plaintiff brought an
action for an accounting which was dismissed on defendants mo-
tion. The court held that Christmas was a special agent and that
in regard to the matters of his special agency, he was under duty
to exercise the utmost good faith and loyalty and make a full and
complete disclosure of all facts relative to the subject of his agency
which may be material for the principal to know. Where the agent
failed in the performance of these duties and made a profit from
such failure, he must account for the profit to his principal. The
case specifically holds that Christmas stood in a confidential rela-
tionship to the plaintiff and by violation of duties owed to plaintiff
abused this relationship.
The problem of estoppel was raised in Baumgartner v.
Tweedy7 6 in an action for attorney's fees. The defendant alleges
72 Supra, note 68.
73 349 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1960).
74 Id. at 367.
75 353 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1960).
76 354 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1960).
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that the fees, if owed, are the obligation of a limited partnership in
Which defendant claims to be a limited partner. As a further de-
fense defendant alleged that plaintiffs had represented that the
partnership was in fact a limited partnership and were therefore
estopped to claim that defendant was a general partner. The facts
disclose that only a general partnership agreement, prepared by de-
fendant's own personal attorneys, was entered into. In affirming
judgment for plaintiff, the court noted that estoppel only arises
where one, relying upon another's conduct, detrimentally alters his
position. The evidence did not support the defense of estoppel.
Plaintiff, in Waterman v. Perrotta,77 obtained judgment against
defendant for the full amount of the balance due plaintiff on a note
executed by a third party to plaintiff. The third party, after execu-
tion of the note, sold his business to defendant. There was no at-
tempt to comply with the Bulk Sales Law.7 8 Although the total as-
sets received by the defendant from the third party were worth
only $3,320, the defendant had paid $4,008 to his vendors' creditors
before learning of the claim of plaintiff. The vendor in the mean-
time died. The court held that the plaintiff need not prove that his
claim against the third party was for a loan regarding the business
nor for the purchase of any articles that were sold. Nor must plain-
tiff show that his claim was due and payable at the time of the sale
in order to be protected by the act.79 The defendant-purchaser,
however, was held to be liable as a receiver only to the extent of
77 355 P.2d 313 (Colo. 1960).
78 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-1-1 to -3 (1953).









the goods and wares that came into his possession under the sale.
Notwithstanding the fact that defendant voluntarily paid other
creditors 100% of their claims, he is only obligated to pay to plain-
tiff that percentage of plaintiff's $1,500 claim that is equal to the
value of the assets received ($3,320) divided by the total debts ow-
ing by the vendor ($4,008). This percentage was sixty per cent and,
therefore, the judgment previously rendered in favor of plaintiff
was modified, reducing it to the proper percentage.
Plaintiff and defendant in Jackson Enterprises, Inc. v. Ma-
guire"0 entered into an agreement under which plaintiff purchased
certain motel property from defendant agreeing to make certain
payments on the purchase price upon the sale of some of plaintiff's
property located in Illinois. When the Illinois sale did not mate-
rialize, a substituted agreement was reached to provide for pay-
ment of the balance due on the motel. In carrying out this agree-
ment, the defendant's agent secured the legal description of prop-
erties owned by plaintiff in Illinois and was specifically advised by
plaintiff, when the descriptions were shown to her, that plaintiff
would not transfer her Illinois home to defendants. Nevertheless,
when the deed was signed and a trust deed on the motel was given
for the unpaid portion of the purchase price, the deed signed by
plaintiff did include a description covering the Illinois home as well
as the other Illinois property. Upon learning that the Illinois home
had been included in the transfers to defendant, plaintiff brought
an action to reform the contract alleging the inclusion of the Illinois
home to have been a mistake recognizable as such by the defend-
ant. In the meantime, defendant had sold the Illinois home. The
trial court found that the evidence sustained plaintiff's contention
that the home should not have been included and gave judgment
against the defendant for the value of the home, such sum to be
applied against the purchase money note and trust deed which
remained unpaid on the motel. The defendant contended that refor-
mation could not be had for unilateral mistake, but only for mu-
tual mistake established beyond a reasonable doubt by clear and
unequivocal evidence. In affirming the trial court's determination,
the court found that the requirement that evidence of mistake be
clear and convincing was satisfied. The court noted that it must
presume the trial court used this standard as to the quantum of
proof. As to the contention that reformation could be had only for
mutual mistake, the court held that one party cannot knowingly
take advantage of the mistake of the other party to the contract. 81
VII. ACCORD EXECUTORY, TERMINATION BY RESERVED POWER,
DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY, COVENANT NOT To SUE
Buick entered into a contract with Royal to drill an oil well
to the "Granite." Drilling operations were terminated when Buick
lost circulation. The parties then entered into a supplemental agree-
ment which provided for a "compromise settlement of the dispute
now existing between the parties" under the terms of which certain
80 355 P.2d 540 (Colo. 1960).
81 In so doing, the court relied upon the Restatement, Contracts § 505 (1932). "Except as stated
in §§ 506, 509-511, if one party at the time of the execution of a written instrument knows not only
that the writing does not accurately express the intention of the other party as to the terms to be
embodied therein, but knows what that intention is, the latter can have the writing reformed so that
it will express that intention."
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monies were paid to Buick and Buick resumed drilling, the supple-
mental agreement making provision for payment of additional serv-
ices. When circulation was again lost, the well was abandoned by
mutual consent and Buick tendered its bill to Royal. Royal asked
for an extension of time in which to pay and executed and deliv-
ered a promissory note in the amount of the billing by Buick. The
court found in Royal Oil & Gas Co. v. Buick Drilling, Inc.82 that
Royal's counterclaim for damages for alleged breaches by Buick
under the original contract was waived and merged in the supple-
mental agreement. It further specifically held that the acknowl-
edgment of the unliquidated and disputed claim by the execution
and tendering of the promissory note constituted an obligation en-
forceable as an account stated or an executory accord.
83
This case, Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agricul-
ture,84 appears in an earlier report on a different point.85 Plaintiff-
in-error here seeks reversal of a judgment of dismissal. The con-
tract sued upon provided that "the state . . .may terminate this
contract at any time subject only to the service guarantee herein
specified .... ", The state terminated the contract under the above
power. The service guarantee provided that a specified rental
would be paid for each available aircraft requested by the state
which was ready for immediate operation during times that spray-
ing operations were prevented because of weather conditions, etc.
The specified rental was to be charged against the price of .13750
per acre sprayed and if the payments based upon the acres sprayed
exceeded the rental, no additional rental would be payable. A little
less than twenty-five percent of the total acreage, which was con-
templated to be sprayed, was sprayed prior to termination of the
the consequences of its own improvident act in entering into the
contract, approving a previous holding to the same effect.
8 7
In an action to recover the balance due on a debt evidenced by
a chattel mortgage, the defendant in Castle Canon Co. v. Atwood 8
answered that the debt was discharged in his bankruptcy proceed-
ings. The debt was evidenced by a combined note and chattel mort-
gage naming Gamble Equipment Company payee and contained an
assignment from Gamble to Universal C. I. T. with provision that
"all payments are due at Universal C. I. T.'s office, New York, Chi-
cago or San Francisco . . . ." In bankruptcy schedule A-2, the de-
fendant listed "C. I. T. Corporation, Centennial Building, 210 West
Tenth Street, Kansas City, Missouri" and described the debt. The
court rejected the contention of Universal C. I. T. Corporation's
successor in interest that the debt had not been properly scheduled
since the full name of the assignee was not given and the address
used was different from the general address stated in the instru-
ment. The evidence showed that the debtor had made payments to
R2 348 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1960).
8.3 See Corbin, Contracts, § 1312 (1951).
84 348 P.2d 962 (Colo. 1960).
85 Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture, 136 Cola. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).
R6 Supra note 84 at 964.
87 Hanks v. McNeil Coal Corp., 114 Colo. 578, 168 P.2d 256 (1946), "Hence it is a general rule
that if a party enters into a contract or cny other legal transaction with sufficient mental capacity to
understand it, and not under the influence of fraud, coercion or imposition, the courts will not relieve
him of the consequences of his act on the sole ground that the bargain is, as to him, improvident, rash,
foolish or oppressive."
88 351 P.2d 459 (Colo. 1960).
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C. I. T.'s Kansas City office on another obligation which was sched-
uled in the debtor's petition in bankruptcy. On this state of facts,
the court held that the course of dealings between the defendant
and plaintiff's assignor amounted to a waiver of the right of C. I. T.
to insist on the full use of its name or that notice of the bankruptcy
proceeding be sent to one of the general offices listed in the as-
signed mortgage. Consequently, the debt was discharged and the
defense of discharge in bankruptcy was good.
In Carroll v. Stancato89 the trial court's entry of a preliminary
injunction against defendants' employees teaching the accordion
for plaintiff was affirmed. The defendants' contracts of employ-
ment provided that the employees would not compete with the em-
ployer for a period of five years after terminating their employ-
ment. The evidence showed that the employees were not only com-
peting at the termination of their employment, but were using the
employer's studio, his instruments and his telephone number. They
had, in fact, "confiscated their employer's school in toto, complete
with instruments and music." It was pointed out that the determ-
ination on the application for preliminary injunction is not a de-
termination of the merits of the case upon trial.
The case of Hamm v. Thompson ° involves a question of wheth-
er a covenant not to sue given to the employer who is liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior for the active negligence of its
employee bars a tort action against the employee under the doc-
trine of Price v. BakerY1 This question was answered in the nega-
tive, the reason given being that where the master's liability for the
tort of his servant arises out of a tort in which the servant is the
sole actor and the master's liability is therefore only imputed or
constructive, based on the doctrine of respondeat superior and
nothing else, the liability is joint and several, but the master and
servant are not joint tort-feasors.
VIII. REAL ESTATE BROKERS COMMISSION CLAIM
In Pyles v. Colorado Land & Inv. Co., 92 a judgment in the
amount of five percent of $62,500 in favor of a broker was reversed.
Defendant Pyles owned a liquor store and discussed his willingness
to sell it for a net price of $65,000 with an officer of plaintiff. No
listing was signed. Two and one-half months later, the defendant
sold the store to persons whom the plaintiff, a year later, claims
were his prospects. The evidence showed that defendant was un-
acquainted with any such claim at the time of sale. Judgment was
reversed. The court found that the broker did not comply with the
terms of the "listing," if there were any; the defendant at the time
of sale had no notice of previous negotiations between broker and
purchaser, the broker had not produced a purchaser ready, willing
and able to buy on the terms prescribed by the owner and it did
not appear that plaintiff was the efficient agent or procuring cause
of the sale nor the predominating effective cause of the sale.
In the case of Bradley Realty Inv. Co. ', -zhwartz,9 3 plaintiff
9 354 P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1960).
90 353 P.2d 73 (Colo. 1960).
91 352 P.2d 90 (1959).
92 355 P.2d 953 (Colo. 190.
fig 357 P.2d 638 (Cc!-, '"""
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had an oral non-exclusive listing regarding a portion of defendant's
property. The listing price was $80,000. Plaintiff found a prospec-
tive purchaser for $75,000 cash and testified that defendant said he
would take the deal and for plaintiff to bring him the contract. De-
fendant testified that he told plaintiff to bring the contract so that
defendant could look at it. There was conflicting testimony on the
reason defendant did not accept the contract. The issue posed was
whether plaintiff had procured a buyer ready, willing and able to
purchase on terms stated by defendant. This involved a determina-
tion of whether defendant had agreed to reduce his price to $75,000.
The trial court's order directing a verdict in favor of defendant at
the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony was reversed because a jury
question was posed as to the weight to be given to the evidence and
the credibility of witnesses, there being substantial evidence tend-
ing to establish a cause of action. A second claim in the case was
a claim for commission based on plaintiff's contention that he had
produced a lessee regarding another parcel of defendant's property.
This prospect had been shown one parcel but no lease was ever ar-
ranged. Later, this prospect and the defendant negotiated a lease
on a different parcel than that shown the prospect by plaintiff. Dis-
missal of the claim for commission based on the subsequent lease
was affirmed. The broker had not produced a lessee ready, willing
and able to lease the property on the terms and at the price desig-
nated by the defendant. The broker was not the efficient agent or
procuring cause of the lease.
94
Fistell v. Thomas95 is another action by a real estate broker for
commission. The broker claimed the commission from the vendor in
his first claim and claimed damages against the vendor and the
purchasers based upon a civil conspiracy to prevent the broker from
securing his commission in his second claim. The broker did not
have an exclusive listing and at best had an oral listing. Further,
the owner was advertising the property for sale himself and had
given a listing to others. The only connection between the broker
and the sale was that on inquiry by a person bearing the same name
as one of the purchasers, the broker stated that the property in-
volved was for sale and on inquiry by another of the ultimate pur-
chasers relayed the name of this person to the owner. The broker
94 The same rule is distinctly stated in Heady v. Tomlinson, 134 Colo. 33, 299 P.2d 120 (1956).
95 355 P.2d 105 (Colo. 1960).
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at no time brought the owner and the purchasers together. In ac-
cord with several recent cases,96 the trial court's dismissal of the
complaint and entry of judgment in favor of all defendants at the
conclusion of plaintiff's testimony was affirmed. Since plaintiff was
not entitled to a commission, he was not entitled to claim damages
by reason of conspiracy to prevent him from securing the commis-
sion, if such conspiracy ever existed. This follows from the rule
stated in an earlier case 97 holding that "recovery of damages in the
civil action for conspiracy, except in situations not here applicable,
is not based on the conspiracy itself, but on damages resulting from
an overt act or acts of one or more of defendants, resulting from
the conspiracy. . . ." It is believed that an action for wrongful in-
terference with expectation of contract could be maintained against
a conniving buyer in an appropriate case.
In Credit Inv. & Loan Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 98 the
plaintiff brought action against the bank and its president for an
alleged breach of contract. The contract provided that the bank
would purchase the plaintiff's negotiable paper upon certain terms
with recourse to plaintiff. The contract had the typical provision
for the establishment of a reserve account to which might be
charged such paper as the plaintiff was required to accept under
the recourse provision. Plaintiff contended that the bank breached
the contract by exercising control of collection of the paper involved
and that plaintiff was entitled to be paid the amount of the reserve
account as well as damages on a second claim for failure of the
bank to accept additional paper. The bank's president was sued
personally on the theory of wrongful interference with contract re-
lations by inducing the bank to breach the contract with plaintiff.
A motion for summary judgment in favor of the bank was granted.
This judgment was reversed and remanded with directions that the
trial court enter an order that the defendants answer or otherwise
plead to the second amended complaint.
The defense of res adjudicata was raised and rejected in two
contract cases. It was held in Hizel v. Howard99 that a judgment of
dismissal of a dance student's previous action100 to rescind a con-
tract entered into with her instructors (the previous action having
affirmed the existence of a valid contract between the parties) is
not res adjudicata as to the student's subsequent action for breach
of the same contract. There were subsequent breaches arising out
of the instructor's having advised the student that the cost of the
previous litigation would be set off against the value of the lessons
remaining under the contract and that no lessons remained due.
The court specifically points out that it is to be presumed that par-
ties will act in accordance with their legal obligations and it is not
to be said that when contractual obligations of the parties had been
confirmed as a result of the previous suit there would be a breach
by repudiating the existence of the contract.
In Benson v. Bottger,1° 1 the Bottgers entered into an agreement
96 Carpenter v. Francis, 136 Colo. 494, 319 P.2d 497 (1957); Johns v. Ambrose, Williams & Co.,
136 Colo. 390, 317 P.2d 897 (1957).
q7 Lockwood Grader Corp. v. Bochaus, 129 Colo. 339, 270 P.2d 193 (1954).
98 353 P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1960).
99 354 P.2d 611 (Colo. 1960).
100 Collins v. Howard, 130 Colo. 272, 274 P.2d 977 (1954).
101 354 P.2d 601 (Colo. 1960).
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to trade certain property for a resort owned by the Gehrleins. The
Bottgers believed that the resort was under a five year lease with
an annual rental of $3,000 per year. After the trade was consum-
mated, the lessees, Bensons, claimed that the rent for the full five
year term was $3,000 and referred Bottgers to a copy of the lease
the Bensons had recorded. The recorded lease had been altered
by the Bensons in that a rider providing for the annual rental of
$3,000, in place of $3,000 for the five year term, had been removed
from the lease prior to recording. The Bottgers then brought action-
against the Gehrleins claiming material misrepresentation and
praying for rescission. The Gehrleins filed a third party complaint
against the Bensons alleging fraud and deceit in altering the lease
prior to its recording. Bottger's action against the Gehrleins was
dismissed with prejudice following both the Bottgers and the Ben-
sons executing a release to the Gehrleins, and the Gehrleins execut-
ing releases to the Bottgers and the Bensons. The Bottgers did not
release the Bensons. The Bensons' motion to dismiss the Gehrleins'
third party complaint was never ruled upon. Thereafter, the Bott-
gers sued the Bensons for three years rental at $3,000 per year. The
Bensons appealed from an adverse judgment claiming that the dis-
missal of the previous action was a bar to the present action under
the doctrine of res adjudicata. In affirming the judgment of the
trial court, it was pointed out that there were four elements which
must be shown if a defendant is to avail himself of the plea of res
adjudicata.
10 2
It is to be noted that the present action, unlike previous actions
before the court, does not involve identity of parties. The Bottgers
and the Bensons were not "opposing parties" in the original action.
Even under past decisions, the Bensons defense would fail.1113 Such
decisions do not bar a second proceeding based upon a different
claim from that litigated and determined in the first action. The
Bensons were not previously sued by the Bottgers, they were never
released by the Bottgers and the prior case raised no issue between
them. Its dismissal only barred the Bottgers from again asserting
a claim against the Gehrleins based on an allegation that the lease
rentals were different from what the Gehrleins represented them
to be.
102 These elements are: (a) Identity of subject matter; (b) Identity of cause of action; (c) Identity
of persons to the action; and (d) Identity of capacity in the persons for which or against whom the
claim is made.
103 Youngquest v. Youngquest, 102 Colo. 105, 110, 76 P.2d 1117, 1119 (1938).
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